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This article considers the increased use of mandatory sentencing provisions in
a range of jurisdictions, including Canada, Australia, the United States, and
United Kingdom/Europe. It finds that, whereas some courts have struck out
mandatory sentencing laws, often mandatory minimum penalties have been
validated. This jurisprudence is considered through a range of themes, including
notions of arbitrariness, the doctrine of proportionality, the relevance of objectives
of the criminal justice system, and broader questions regarding the separation of
powers.
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I N TRODUCT ION
The use of mandatory sentencing around the world has increased in recent
years. Governments have responded to community perceptions that some
courts have been ‘‘too soft’’ on crime, or that sentencing outcomes are
unpredictable and uncertain, by introducing minimum mandatory sen-
tencing provisions. These are designed to create certainty in sentencing,
and lead to sentencing outcomes considered more reflective of community
* Anthony Gray is Professor of Law at the University of Southern Queensland, Australia.
He received his LLB and LLM from Queensland University of Technology and his PhD
from the University of New South Wales. His major research interests are in the area of
human rights, constitutional law, and comparative law. He thanks the anonymous reviewer
and the Editor of the Review for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article, and the
copy editor for their diligent work.
| 391
New Criminal Law Review, Vol. 20, Number 3, pps 391–432. ISSN 1933-4192, electronic
ISSN 1933-4206.©2017byTheRegentsof theUniversityofCalifornia.All rights reserved.Please
direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the
University of California Press’s Reprints and Permissions web page, http://www.ucpress.edu/
journals.php?p¼reprints. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1525/nclr.2017.20.3.391.
standards. However, their use has been challenged on constitutional and
human rights grounds, on the basis that they may lead to cruel and unusual
punishment, and/or arbitrary outcomes, and may not achieve any of the
goals traditionally pursued by criminal justice systems. They may also
subvert the traditional role of courts.
Part I of this article involves a survey of the current law relating to
minimum mandatory sentencing in a range of jurisdictions. The discussion
will be focused on several themes, in particular questions of arbitrariness,
proportionality, the extent to which such regimes meet criminal justice
goals, and separation of powers questions. We will see that most jurisdic-
tions have some kind of prohibition on cruel and unusual, and/or arbitrary,
punishment, though there has been a wide divergence in how these pro-
hibitions have been interpreted, with Canada interpreting these prohibi-
tions most broadly. Part II considers these themes in more detail and
considers how arguments favoring mandatory sentencing regimes can be
met. The Conclusion will offer some insights on the existing state of the
case law, and what kinds of reforms are needed.
I . MANDATORY SENTENC ING AROUND THE WORLD
Case law on mandatory sentencing from a range of jurisdictions will now
be studied. In so doing, the article will make particular note of the follow-
ing principles in the case law, given the themes of the article developed
later: (a) the extent to which concepts of arbitrariness influence a court’s
decision regarding whether mandatory sentencing is valid; (b) the extent to
which concepts of proportionality influence a court’s decision regarding
whether mandatory sentencing is valid, and how proportionality is mea-
sured; (c) the extent to which the purpose of the incarceration, and whether
it meets any traditional goal/s of the criminal justice system, determines
the validity of provisions; and (d) the extent to which separation of
powers principles have been utilized in relation to mandatory sentencing
provisions.
A. Canada
The Canadian Supreme Court first struck out a mandatory sentencing
regime as being contrary to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
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in Smith v. The Queen.1 There the offender pleaded guilty to drug impor-
tation, which attracted a minimum jail term of seven years. He argued the
provision was contrary to the Canadian Charter, specifically § 9 forbidding
arbitrary detention and punishment and § 12 forbidding cruel and unusual
punishment. A majority of the Court held the offense provision was for-
bidden by § 12, and not saved by § 1.2
The Court confirmed that, although the legislature had broad power to
prescribe offenses and the penalties to be applied for such offenses, there
were limits; specifically, § 12 prohibited a legislature from imposing a pun-
ishment that was grossly disproportionate.3 In assessing whether or not
a punishment breached this requirement, relevant factors included the
gravity of the offense, personal characteristics of the offender, and the
particular circumstances of the case to determine an appropriate range to
fulfil legitimate penological objectives like punishment, rehabilitation,
deterrence, or community protection.4 Although minimum mandatory
sentences did not always breach the requirements of § 12, there was a breach
on this occasion because the offense applied to numerous different sub-
stances involving various degrees of dangerousness, and did not take into
account the quantity of drug imported.5 The purpose of the importation
also was not taken into account.6
1. Smith, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045.
2. Dickson CJ, Lamer, Wilson, Le Dain, and La Forest JJ; McIntyre J dissenting. The
Court had earlier clarified its approach to § 1, which provides the rights enshrined in the
Charter are guaranteed, subject to such reasonable limits as can be justified in a free and
democratic society. The Court found § 1 required the government firstly to identify an
important objective to which the challenged legislation is aimed, which could justify
overriding the human right involved. Then it would need to show the measures had been
carefully designed to achieve that aim, and not arbitrary, unfair, or irrational; they were
rationally connected to that objective and minimally invaded the right affected, and there
was proportionality between the effects of the measures and the identified objective: R v.
Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 138–39 (Dickson, Chouinard, Lamer, Wilson, and Le Dain JJ).
McIntyre J found that the prohibition in § 12 was absolute, not subject to proportionality
analysis in § 1 (1108), with whom Le Dain J agreed (1111).
3. Smith, 1072 (Dickson CJ and Lamer J) (with whom La Forest J agreed).
4. Id. at 1073 (Dickson CJ and Lamer J) (with whom La Forest J agreed); McIntyre J also
found that punishment that went beyond what was necessary to achieve a valid social aim,
having regard to legitimate purposes of punishment and the adequacy of alternatives, would
breach § 12 (1098), with whom Le Dain J agreed (1111).
5. Id. at 1078 (Dickson CJ and Lamer J) (with whom La Forest J agreed).
6. Id.
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The measures could not be saved under § 1 because they failed the
second aspect of proportionality analysis7—although clearly the fight
against drug offending was an important objective in relation to § 1 anal-
ysis, it was not necessary to impose a mandatory minimum jail term of
seven years to deter drug offenders.8 The legitimate objective could be
achieved through a more narrowly circumscribed offense having regard
to the particular drug, particular quantities, and/or repeat offenders.9 There
was difference of opinion among justices as to whether notions of arbitrar-
iness were relevant to a determination of whether punishment was cruel
and unusual in § 12.10 Some justices considered whether the law ‘‘out-
raged’’ or ‘‘shocked’’ the public conscience.11
A minimum mandatory sentencing regime applied to firearms offenses
was recently struck out by the Supreme Court as being contrary to the
requirements of 12 of the Charter, and not saved by § 1.12 The minimum
mandatory provision (three years’ jail for a first offense, five for a subsequent
offense) applied to a person in possession of a firearm either without
a license or where the firearm was unregistered.
7. In R v. Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 138–39 (Dickson CJ, for Chouinard Lamer Wilson
and Le Dain JJ), the Supreme Court had adopted a two-stage approach to a challenge to
laws that prima facie violated the Charter. Once such a violation had been discovered, it was
for the authorities to explain an objective that the legislation was designed to serve that was
sufficient to override a constitutionally protected right or freedom. Secondly, the authorities
would have to show that the means chosen were reasonable and demonstrably justified. This
suggested a proportionality approach, involving a balancing of societal, group, and individ-
ual interests. It included consideration of whether the measures adopted were carefully
designed to achieve the designated objective, and not arbitrary, unfair, or irrational. They
should minimally impair the relevant right or freedom. There should be proportionality
between the effects of the measures limiting the right or freedom and the designated
objective.
8. Smith, 1080 (Dickson CJ and Lamer J) (with whom La Forest J agreed).
9. Id. at 1081 (Dickson CJ and Lamer J) (with whom La Forest J agreed).
10. Dickson CJ and Lamer J held notions of arbitrariness comprised a ‘‘minimal factor’’
([1076]); in contrast McIntyre J said an arbitrary law (one not applied on a rational basis in
accordance with identifiable standards) would contravene § 12 ([1098]), as did Wilson J
([1109]) and Le Dain J ([1111]); La Forest J expressly declined to express a view on the matter
([1113]).
11. McIntyre J ([1097]), Wilson J ([1109]), and Le Dain J ([1111]).
12. R v. Nur [2015] 1 S.C.R. 773 (McLachlin CJ, Le Bel, Abella, Cromwell, Karakatsanis,
and Gascon JJ; Rothstein, Moldaver, and Wagner JJ dissenting).
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All justices reiterated that § 12 prohibited the imposition of grossly
disproportionate sentences.13 Relevant to this consideration were the
nature of the offense, circumstances of the offender, and the objectives
of the relevant criminal law legislation.14 It stated that a proportionate
sentence was a highly individualized exercise, having regard to the gravity
of the offense, blameworthiness of the offender, and harm caused by the
crime. Mandatory minimum sentences could threaten proportionality in
sentencing because:
They emphasize denunciation, general deterrence and retribution at the
expense of what is a fit sentence for the gravity of the offence, the blame-
worthiness of the offender, and the harm caused by the crime. They func-
tion as a blunt instrument that may deprive courts of the ability to tailor
proportionate sentences at the lower end of a sentencing range. They may,
in extreme cases, impose unjust sentences, because they shift the focus from
the offender during the sentencing process in a way that violates the prin-
ciple of proportionality.15
The majority noted the law as framed could catch offending that carried
little or no moral fault, and little or no danger to the public.16 It was ‘‘out of
sync’’ with the norms and objectives set out in the criminal legislation, and
legitimate expectations in a free and democratic society.17 A five-year jail
term for an offender against weapons legislation was beyond what was
needed to protect the public, what was needed to express moral condem-
nation of the offender, and what was necessary to achieve deterrence.18
The penalty could conceivably be imposed on a person who, not having
a license, had innocently come into possession of a firearm. Such an
offender would have caused no harm, and was not a risk to public safety,
13. Nur, 798 (McLachlin CJ, Le Bel, Abella, Cromwell, Karakatsanis, and Gascon JJ);
843 (Moldaver, Rothstein, and Wagner JJ). The dissenters concluded that the prosecutor’s
discretion to charge an alleged offender with an offense not attracting the mandatory
minimum saved the mandatory minimum scheme from invalidity, as they concluded that ‘‘a
decision to prosecute by indictment that would give rise to a grossly disproportionate
sentence represents a per se abuse of process in violation of § 12’’ (845).
14. Id. at 798 and 801 (McLachlin CJ, Le Bel, Abella, Cromwell, Karakatsanis, and
Gascon JJ).
15. Id. at 800 (McLachlin CJ, Le Bel, Abella, Cromwell, Karakatsanis, and Gascon JJ).
16. Id. at 815 (McLachlin CJ, Le Bel, Abella, Cromwell, Karakatsanis, and Gascon JJ).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 823 (McLachlin CJ, Le Bel, Abella, Cromwell, Karakatsanis, and Gascon JJ).
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yet would be subject to the minimum mandatory sentencing regime. This
would be draconian.19 The law was not saved under § 1 using the Oakes
approach identified above.20 The majority noted numerous studies to the
effect that minimum mandatory sentencing regimes did not deter criminal
behavior.21 Further, the law was not minimally invasive of human rights; it
was not necessary to impose the harsh mandatory minimum penalties to
achieve the legitimate objective of gun control. The minimum mandatory
penalties applied to too broad a range of offenses, with widely varying
degrees of culpability and seriousness.22
Canada’s constitutional commitment to proportionality in sentencing
was recently reconfirmed by all justices.23 The Court confirmed that ‘‘laws
that curtail liberty in a way that is arbitrary, overbroad or grossly dispro-
portionate do not conform to the principles of fundamental justice,’’24 and
that legislators could not require sentencing courts to impose grossly
disproportionate punishment.25 In so stating, the Court noted the link
between proportional sentencing and the public’s confidence in the judicial
system,26 itself critical to its continued functionality.
B. Australia
Prior to considering the Australian case law, it must be borne in mind that
the country lacks a national bill of rights. There is no constitutional pro-
vision expressly prohibiting the imposition of cruel and unusual
19. Id.
20. See supra note 7.
21. Id. at 826 (McLachlin CJ, Le Bel, Abella, Cromwell, Karakatsanis, and Gascon JJ).
22. Id. at 827 (McLachlin CJ, Le Bel, Abella, Cromwell, Karakatsanis, and Gascon JJ).
To be clear, the Court did not find that the sentences given to the particular offenders who
challenged the law inNur were grossly disproportionate, but that the provisions were invalid
because they would facilitate the imposition of grossly disproportionate punishments in
reasonably foreseeable cases (805).
23. R v. Safarzadeh-Markhali [2016] SCC 14, [22](the Court); see also R v. Ipeelee [2012]
1 S.C.R 433, stating that ‘‘proportionality is the sine qua non of a just sanction’’ and noting
its indispensability in ensuring that the public retained confidence in the judicial system
([37]) (Le Bel J, for McLachlin CJ, Binnie, Deschamps, Fish, and Abella JJ).
24. Safarzadeh-Markhali, [22](McLachlin CJ, for the Court); and R v. Ipeelee [2012] 1
S.C.R. 433, where the Court noted that a fundamental aspect of sentencing was that it was
proportionate: [36](Le Bel J, for McLachlin CJ, Binnie, Deschamps, Fish, and Abella JJ).
25. Id. at [71](McLachlin CJ, for the Court).
26. Id. at [70](McLachlin CJ, for the Court).
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punishment, and/or disproportionate sentencing. It is possible that the Bill
of Rights Act 1689 (U.K.), including its prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment, could be taken to have been received into Australian law.
However, the section has received virtually no attention in the Australian
case law, and its status in Australian law is very weak.27
Apart from the very limited range of express human rights provisions
found in the Australian Constitution, none of which are relevant here, the
main way in which constitutional protection of human rights can be sought
is, indirectly, through the principle of the separation of powers. Like the
Constitution of the United States (upon which it was modelled), the
Australian Constitution provides for an express separation of powers
between the executive, legislative, and judicial functions.28 Somewhat
unexpectedly, this has become the main avenue for the protection of
fundamental human rights in Australia. The Australian High Court has
found that legislation is vulnerable to constitutional challenge where it
requires, or authorizes, a court to depart from traditional judicial
method.29 A law that undermines the institutional integrity of a court is
constitutionally invalid.30 The Court has relied on American authorities
such asMistretta v. United States31 in articulating this principle, specifically
that the legislature may not borrow the judiciary to ‘‘cloak’’ its work in the
neutral colors of judicial action.32
As this phenomenon is recent, the Court continues to articulate the
precise characteristics of traditional judicial method, departure from which
might trigger unconstitutionality. So far, we know laws that leave a court
no discretion other than to make an order sought by the executive are
constitutionally invalid on this basis,33 as are laws prohibiting a court from
27. A rare case inwhich it was mentioned was R v. Smith; Ex Parte Cooper [1992] 1QdR 423.
28. Chapter I of the Australian Constitution deals with Legislative Power, Chapter III
with Executive Power, and Chapter III with Judicial Power.
29. Bass v. Permanent Trustee Co. Ltd. (1999) 198 CLR 334, 359 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron,
McHugh, Gummow, Hayne, and Callinan JJ).
30. Wainohu v. New South Wales (2011) 243 CLR 181, 206 (French CJ and Kiefel J),
228–29 (Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, and Bell JJ).
31. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361, 407 (1989) (Blackmun J, for Rehnquist CJ. White. Marshall.
Stevens. O’Connor. Kennedy. and Brennan JJ).
32. For example, Kable v. Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1997) 189 CLR 51, 133
(Gummow J); South Australia v. Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1, 172 (Kiefel J); Kuczborski v.
Queensland [2014] HCA 46, [228](Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler, and Keane JJ).
33. South Australia v. Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1.
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giving reasons for its decisions,34 and laws requiring a court to hear an
application in the absence of the other party to the proceeding.35 A law that
sought to remove a superior court’s ability to overturn a decision for
jurisdictional error would also be invalid.36 It is possible that, via these
means, other characteristics of a common law judicial process that are
considered fundamental characteristics of judicial process—like presump-
tion of innocence, right to silence,37 right to confront witnesses, and right
to open courts38—would be constitutionally protected.
On minimum mandatory sentencing, it might have been open to the
court to find such provisions undermine a key characteristic of judicial
power. It might be argued that sentencing, which has been recognized as an
exclusively judicial function in the separation of powers realm,39 is char-
acterized by a judge considering a range of factors in determining an
appropriate sentence that is proportionate to the gravity of the offense,
circumstances of the offense, and circumstances of the offender. Tradition-
ally, this is how sentencing has been carried out by courts based on the
common law system. And a law that short-circuited much of that process,
by simply requiring a court to impose a sentence crafted in the abstract by
the legislature in a situation necessarily removed from actual facts and cir-
cumstances of a given case, would be anathema to traditional judicial process,
and for that reason unconstitutional.40 Such an argument enjoys academic
34. Wainohu v. New South Wales (2011) 243 CLR 181.
35. International Finance Trust v. New South Wales Crime Commission (2009) 240
CLR 319.
36. Kirk v. Industrial Relations Commission (2010) 239 CLR 531.
37. X7 v. Australian Crime Commission (2013) 248 CLR 92, 140–41 (Hayne and Bell JJ),
153 (Kiefel J).
38. Russell v. Russell (1976) 134 CLR 495.
39. Chu Kheng Lim v. Minister for Immigration (1992) 176 CLR 1, 27, where Brennan,
Deane, and Dawson JJ refer to the ‘‘exclusively judicial function of adjudging and punishing
criminal guilt,’’ with whom Mason CJ agreed (10).
40. Such an argument finds support in past Chapter III case law. For example, Gaudron J
stated in Re Nolan; Ex Parte Young (1991) 172 CLR 460, 497 the key role that the judicial
process played in protecting an individual from ‘‘arbitrary punishment’’; two justices in Ni-
cholas v. The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173 found legislation directing a court to ignore that
evidence was obtained unlawfully in determining what weight ought be given to it was
unconstitutional, as it purported to direct the court in the exercise of its discretion. In Chu
Kheng Lim v. The Commonwealth (1992) 176CLR 1, 36–37, three members of the Court found
an attempt by parliament to direct the courts as to the manner and outcome of the exercise of
their discretion would be constitutionally invalid (Brennan, Deane, and Dawson JJ).
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support,41 and the endorsement of the Law Council of Australia42 and the
Judicial Council of Australia, the umbrella organization of Australia’s
judges.43
Indeed, elsewhere, and recently, the High Court had declared unconsti-
tutional legislation that effectively required a court to make a control order
with respect to an individual who was a member of an organization deemed
criminal by the government. The court had no discretion to refuse to make
the order; a majority found the legislation constitutionally invalid.44
However, that is not how the challenges to minimum mandatory sen-
tencing have fared—to date, at least. The first case considering the con-
stitutionality of minimum mandatory sentencing in Australia in detail was
Palling v. Corfield.45 It must be noted this decision was rendered at a time
when the full implications of the separation of powers principles of the
Australian Constitution had not been recognized. There the challenged
legislation provided for a mandatory seven-day jail term if a person did not
attend a medical examination relating to conscription. In validating the
provision, Barwick CJ conceded mandatory sentencing was ‘‘unusual’’ and
‘‘undesirable,’’ but noted:
It is beyond question that parliament can prescribe such penalty as it thinks
fit for the offences which it creates. It may make the penalty absolute in the
sense that there is but one penalty which the court is empowered to impose
41. Desmond Manderson & Naomi Sharp, Mandatory Sentences and the Constitution:
Discretion, Responsibility and Judicial Process, 22 SYDNEY L. REV. 585 (2000).
42. Policy Discussion Paper on Mandatory Sentencing (2014).
43. Submission to the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs
Inquiry into the Migration Amendment (Removal of Mandatory Minimum Penalties) Bill
2012.
44. South Australia v. Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1, French CJ, Gummow, Hayne,
Crennan, Kiefel, and Bell JJ, Heydon J dissenting. For example, the view of Crennan and
Bell JJ that ‘‘legislation which draws a court into the implementation of government policy,
by confining the court’s adjudicative process so that the court is directed or required to
implement legislative or executive determinations without following ordinary judicial
processes, will deprive that court of the characteristics of an independent and impartial
tribunal (and would be constitutionally invalid)’’ (157).
45. Palling (1970) 123 CLR 52. The matter had been considered briefly in Fraser Hemleins
Pty. Ltd. v. Cody (1945) 70 CLR 100, where the High Court quickly dismissed an argument
that a minimum mandatory penalty was unconstitutional; Latham CJ on the basis ‘‘it had
never been suggested’’ (119), Starke J on the basis that if the legislature could prescribe
a maximum, it could also prescribe a minimum (122), and Williams J on the basis the
legislature could provide whatever punishment it wished (139).
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and . . . it may lay an unqualified duty on the court to impose that penalty.
The exercise of the judicial function is the act of imposing the penalty
consequent upon conviction of the offence which is essentially a judicial act.
If the statute nominates the penalty and imposes on the court a duty to
impose it, no judicial power or function is invaded.46
The question was raised once again recently in Magaming v. The
Queen.47 The challenge concerned § 233C of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth),
providing a minimum mandatory penalty of five years’ imprisonment for
someone who arranged for the entry into Australia of non-Australian citi-
zens with no lawful right to enter the country (commonly known as
‘‘people smugglers’’), where they brought at least five people in at once.
By majority of 6-1, the High Court rejected the challenge.
The joint reasons stated the court’s sentencing function was not
unbounded, but was constrained by statutory limitations. Sentencing had
to take place according to law. They agreed judges needed ‘‘sentencing
yardsticks’’; provision of a minimum mandatory penalty was merely one
of those, albeit a rare and exceptional form.48 The joint reasons agreed:
the sentence imposed must be proportionate in the sense that it properly
reflects the personal circumstances of the particular offender and the par-
ticular conduct in which the offender engaged when those circumstances
and that conduct are compared with other offenders and offending.49
However, notwithstanding this, the joint reasons concluded the mere
fact a sentence may be judged to be ‘‘harsh’’ did not mean it was consti-
tutionally invalid.50 Nor was it clear the basis upon which a court might
find a sentence ‘‘harsh’’51 or beyond what was necessary to achieve a par-
ticular purpose, such as deterrence.
46. Palling, supra note 45, at 58; Windeyer, Owen, Walsh, and Gibbs JJ agreed. Menzies
J was slightly ambivalent, conceding that parliament ‘‘can, to some extent’’ validly control
the exercise of judicial power (64), and that courts must act within the framework of the
laws made by parliament ‘‘unless the Constitution otherwise provides’’ (65).
47. Magaming, (2013) 252 CLR 381.
48. Id. at 396 (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, and Bell JJ); 414 (Keane J).
49. Id. at 397 (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, and Bell JJ).
50. Id. at 398 (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, and Bell JJ).
51. Id. at 397 (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, and Bell JJ); Gageler J (dissenting)
invalidated the legislation on the basis that because the prosecutor had the choice of
charging a person either with an offense under § 233C (containing the minimum mandatory
penalty) or a lesser offense (comprising essentially the same conduct less one aggravating
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C. United States
Given the large number of American cases concerning the Eighth Amend-
ment, the discussion following will focus on what are considered to have
been the main developments in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence over the
years, particularly having regard to the themes identified at the beginning
of this Part of the article.
The United States Supreme Court established in the early twentieth
century that the Eighth Amendment prohibition on ‘‘cruel and unusual
punishment,’’ derived from the Bill of Rights Act 1689 (U.K.), could apply
to length of imprisonment and condition of imprisonment, as well as to
methods of punishment.52 That case, Weems v. United States, involved
imposition in the Philippines (with a provision identical to the Eighth
Amendment, and which the court determined should be interpreted to
mean the same as the Eighth Amendment) of a minimum 12 year jail term
for fraud. The offender was to be chained, would be expected to participate
in ‘‘hard and painful labor,’’ derive no assistance from friend or family, have
no marital authority or parental rights, or rights of property. The Court
established that a proportionality analysis should be applied to Eighth
Amendment questions. The provision in Weems was unconstitutional
because it was ‘‘cruel in its excess of imprisonment’’ and because of the
‘‘degree and kind’’ of punishment imposed.53 In considering proportion-
ality, the Court noted that degrees of homicide were punished less severely
than the minimum mandatory punishments applicable to this case.54
factor), this choice to be made by a member of the executive infringed the system of sep-
aration of powers for which the Constitution provided. The State of Queensland has im-
plemented a system of minimum mandatory sentencing with respect to offenses committed
by participants in criminal associations. The minimum mandatory sentence is 15 years for
specified offenses committed in the course of the association’s activities, as well as any
sentence for the actual wrongdoing, and a minimum 25 year jail term if the person who
conducted the activities is an office bearer in the association (Vicious Lawless Association
Disestablishment Act 2013 (Qld) (VLAD Act)). A constitutional challenge to the scheme of
which these laws are a part was dismissed in Kuczborski v. Queensland [2014] HCA 46,
although the case did not deal with the minimum mandatory sentencing aspects of the
regime, because the High Court had decided that such schemes were constitutionally valid
the year before inMagaming, even if the sentences in the VLAD Act are more severe than in
Magaming.
52. Weems v. United States 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
53. Weems, 377 (McKenna J, for the Court).
54. Id. at 380 (McKenna J, for the Court).
MANDATORY SENTENCING | 401
There was also a brief indication that concepts of proportionality could or
would be shaped by purposes of punishment,55 a theme to which the
Supreme Court would return in later cases.
In subsequent cases proportionality became entrenched in Eighth
Amendment case law. Its meaning was substantially considered in Solem
v. Helm,56 where the Court referred to proportionality as ‘‘deeply-rooted’’
in common law jurisprudence, citing Magna Carta and its interpretation in
British case law as incorporating proportionality analysis.57 The Court laid
out criteria for determining whether or not a sentence was proportionate,
including the gravity of the offense, its magnitude, the harshness of the
penalty, sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, and
sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions.58 If more
serious crimes were subject to the same penalty, or less serious penalties,
this could suggest excessive punishment.59 Courts could competently
judge the gravity of an offense, at least in relative terms,60 and could
compare different sentences in a meaningful way.61 Intention, or lack
thereof, was relevant.62 The court found a sentence of life imprisonment
without parole for a seventh felony was contrary to the Eighth Amend-
ment. Helm’s offense here was relatively trivial, that of passing a valueless
check with a face value of $100. Although Helm was a repeat offender, and
a state was entitled to treat a repeat offender more harshly, his prior
offending was all non-violent.63
55. Id. at 381 (McKenna J, for the Court).
56. Solem, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
57. Id. at 284–85 (Powell J, for Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens JJ).
58. Id. at 290 (Powell J, for Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens JJ; Burger CJ,
White, Rehnquist, and O’Connor JJ dissenting).
59. Id. at 291 (Powell J, for Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens JJ).
60. Id. at 292 (Powell J, for Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens JJ).
61. Id. at 294 (Powell J, for Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens JJ).
62. Id. at 293 (Powell J, for Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens JJ; Burger CJ,
White, Rehnquist, and O’Connor JJ dissenting).
63. Id. at 296–97 (Powell J, for Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens JJ). However,
in that same year the Court validated a mandatory life sentence on a repeat property crime
offender on the basis that such a penalty was not ‘‘grossly disproportionate’’: Rummel v. Estelle
445 U.S. 263 (1980) (Rehnquist J, for Burger CJ, Stewart, White, and Blackmun; Powell,
Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens JJ dissenting). It is conceded that, in Rummel, the offender
subjected to a life minimum mandatory sentence was required to have twice been imprisoned
for felonies, and the possibility existed that he could be released after serving 12 years’
imprisonment, unlike the situation in Solum. In Rummel the Court also acknowledged some
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An apparent attack on the principle of proportionality occurred in
Harmelin v. Michigan,64 where Scalia J, joined by Rehnquist CJ, denied
proportionality, was a general principle of Eighth Amendment law,65 and
sought to confine the meaning of ‘‘cruel and unusual punishment’’ to
methods of punishment,66 with an exception in relation to the death
penalty where proportionality could be used.67 It was claimed the original
framers intended that the clause would be confined to unprecedented or
unauthorized methods of punishment,68 and did not mean the prohibition
of ‘‘cruel and unusual punishment’’ to apply to disproportionate sen-
tences.69 Notably, they declined to specifically prohibit ‘‘disproportionate’’
punishments.70 Scalia J noted that the 1689 Bill of Rights Act, upon which
American colonial provisions (and subsequently the Eighth Amendment)
were based, did not expressly prohibit disproportionate punishments.71
His reading of the history suggested the purpose of the relevant clause in
the Bill of Rights Act 1689 was to prevent the infliction of punishments that
were ‘‘beyond power’’ and arbitrary, in the sense that they were unprece-
dented and unauthorized.72
Scalia J found that his narrow interpretation of the Eighth Amendment
was workable—there was clear historical evidence regarding the use
of particular methods of punishment;73 and in contrast, there were no
objective measures of gravity by which a court could apply a principle of
proportionality.74 For this reason, he rejected the proportionality analysis
of the practical difficulties involved in that part of proportionality analysis calling for com-
parison of penalties across states. Without declaring such analysis illegitimate, it referred to its
complexities: ‘‘absent a constitutionally imposed uniformity inimical to traditional notions of
federalism, some State will always bear the distinction of treating particular offenders more
severely than any other state’’ (282). Of the judges who heard both cases, only Blackmun J
validated one provision and invalidated the other.
64. Harmelin, 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
65. Id. at 965.
66. Id. at 985.
67. Id. at 994.
68. Id. at 979.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 985.
71. Id. at 967.
72. Id. at 968.
73. Id. at 985.
74. Id. at 988.
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described in Solum, involving a comparison of sentences in other jurisdic-
tions for the same offense, or comparison with offenses regarded as of
similar severity within the one jurisdiction.75
The other majority justices in the result emphasized the deference due to
legislatures in their assessment of the gravity of particular offending, and
that enforcement of minimum mandatory sentences by courts ought to be
the general position, and the setting aside of such sentences on proportion-
ality grounds very much the exceptional case.76 Minimum sentencing
provisions should not be set aside on the basis they were considered to
be unwise. The Eighth Amendment did not mandate acceptance of any
particular penological theory, and the principles underpinning systems of
criminal justice, and their relative importance, change over time. One of
the advantages of a federal system was that it permitted different states to
pursue their own policies in this regard; this made interstate comparisons
complicated.77 Some judges suggested narrowing the use of comparative
sentencing in other jurisdictions to confirming an initial impression that
a sentence was grossly disproportionate, rather than deciding whether it
was so.78 And care must be taken, in applying the ‘‘gross disproportion-
ality’’ doctrine, that the court was not entering into a subjective analysis of
the sentence it thought appropriate, rather than an objective assessment of
the punishment chosen by the legislature.79
Applying these principles, a majority of the Court validated a mandatory
life sentence without the possibility of parole on an offender in possession
of a large quantity of cocaine (1.5 pounds). On the reasoning of Scalia and
Rehnquist CJ, imprisonment was clearly not a ‘‘cruel and unusual’’ method
of punishment. On the reasoning of Kennedy, Souter, and O’Connor JJ,
the state was entitled to view large-scale drug possession seriously; drug
offending was closely related to other types of offending.80 The punishment
was graded according to the quantum of drugs involved, and there was an
‘‘escape hatch’’ from the minimum mandatory sentences in exceptional
cases.81 Seven justices confirmed a principle of gross disproportionality
75. Id. at 988–89.
76. Id. (Kennedy J, for O’Connor and Souter JJ).
77. Id. at 999–1000 (Kennedy J, for O’Connor and Souter JJ).
78. Id. at 1005 (Kennedy J, for O’Connor and Souter JJ).
79. Id. at 1007 (Kennedy, O’Connor, and Souter JJ).
80. Id. at 1003 (Kennedy, O’Connor, and Souter JJ).
81. Id. at 1007 (Kennedy, O’Connor, and Souter JJ).
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should continue to apply to Eighth Amendment challenges, and not just in
capital cases.82 This remains the position.83
Many Eighth Amendment challenges have involved the death penalty.
The Court has ruled that imposition of the death penalty does not neces-
sarily breach the Eighth Amendment,84 it having been a longstanding
feature of English law, of American law at the time the Eighth Amendment
was ratified, and being reflected in the text of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.85 However, a mandatory death penalty will be unconstitu-
tional,86 because it would not permit the consideration of any mitigating
circumstances, and the Court has taken the position that, at least for capital
cases, this is required.87 Attempted imposition of the death penalty for
a non-homicide offense is contrary to the Eighth Amendment, the Court
accepting it was disproportionate given that most states did not impose it
for non-homicide, and the fact juries were extremely unlikely to order such
a penalty for a convicted rapist when they had the legal authority to do so,
both being evidence of community standards and values, which are rele-
vant to questions of gross disproportionality.88
The Eighth Amendment also precludes the imposition of the death
penalty on a minor89 or a person with a mental disability.90 Evidence the
82. Id. at 996 (Kennedy, O’Connor, and Souter JJ) (concurring in the decision); 1018
(White, Blackmun, and Stevens JJ) and 1027 (Marshall J).
83. Lockyer v. Andrade 538 U.S. 63, 72 (O’Connor J, for Rehnquist CJ, Scalia, Kennedy,
and Thomas JJ) (2003).
84. Gregg v. Georgia 428 U.S. 153, 169 (Stewart, Powell, and Stevens JJ; Burger CJ,
Rehnquist, White, and Blackmun concurring) (1976).
85. Gregg, 176–77 (Stewart, Powell, and Stevens JJ; Burger CJ, Rehnquist, White, and
Blackmun JJ concurring) (1976).
86. Roberts v. Louisiana 431 U.S. 633 (1977).
87. Lockett v. Ohio 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
88. Coker v. Georgia 433 U.S. 584, 593–95 (White J, for Stewart, Blackmun, and Stevens
JJ) (1977).
89. Roper v. Simmons 543 U.S. 551 (2005), on the basis that a majority of states do not
provide it for juveniles, and the number of states doing so is diminishing, the fact that
a juvenile lacks maturity and may be prone to reckless behavior, subject to peer pressure
and whose character may be incompletely formed (570), because international opinion is
generally against it (578) and because it is not adequately justified by criminal justice
objectives of deterrence or retribution (570–71) (Kennedy J, for Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer JJ).
90. Atkins v. Virginia 536U.S. 304 (2002), because of the number of states that precluded
it, and the trend was toward legislation precluding it, because of the majority in state
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penalty is being applied in a discriminatory or arbitrary fashion could
suggest the law is unconstitutional,91 as effecting ‘‘unusual’’ punishment.
Similarly, the fact that a punishment is pointless,92 that it is not serving
a penological purpose more effectively than a lesser punishment,93 can
suggest a law that breaches the Eighth Amendment, even if the Court has
not yet by majority decided that the death penalty is generally unconsti-
tutional and offensive to the Eighth Amendment.
The ‘‘gross disproportionality’’ test in the Eighth Amendment has not
prevented what were on any measure extremely harsh sentences on par-
ticular offenders. It did not prevent the imposition of an effective 40-year
jail term on a person convicted of the supply and possession of nine
ounces of marijuana worth $200,94 imposition of a 25-year-to-life jail
term under a three-strikes law where the accused stole $1200 in merchan-
dise with prior property convictions,95 or theft of video tapes worth $200
legislatures that had voted to preclude it (315–16), because those suffering a mental disability
may also exhibit some of the characteristics of juveniles that make imposition of the death
penalty on them inappropriate (such as impulsivity) (318), and this fact also makes it more
difficult for the state to justify the death penalty on a person with a mental disability on the
basis of either retribution or deterrence (319–20) (Stevens J, for O’Connor, Kennedy,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer JJ).
91. Furman v. Georgia 408U.S. 238, 245 (Douglas J), 274 (Brennan J), 309–10 (Stewart J),
and 364 (Marshall J) (1972).
92. Coker v. Georgia 433 U.S. 584, 592 (White J, for Stewart, Blackmun, and Stevens JJ)
(1977); Graham v. Florida 560U.S. 48, 67 (2010) (Kennedy J, for Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer,
and Sotomayor JJ).
93. Furman v. Georgia 408U.S. 238, 279 (Brennan J), 312 (White J), and 359 (Marshall J)
(1972).
94. Hutto v. Davis 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (Burger CJ, White, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and
O’Connor JJ (on the basis that a legislature’s choice of penalty was entitled to deference
(373), court intervention on the basis that a mandatory sentence was grossly dispropor-
tionate should be ‘‘exceedingly rare’’ (374), a court’s decision that a prison sentence was
excessive was inherently subjective in nature (373)), Powell J concurring in the judgment
(considering gravity of offense, precedent such as Rummel, past convictions); Brennan,
Marshall, and Stevens JJ dissenting on the basis the sentence represented a ‘‘patent abuse of
judicial power’’ (388)).
95. Ewing v. California 538U.S. 11 (2003) (O’Connor J, for Rehnquist CJ and Kennedy J
(deference to legislature, Constitution does not prescribe any particular penological theory
states have a valid interest in incapacitating and segregating habitual criminals (25) and high
recidivism rates in state (26), offender’s long criminal history (29), with whom Scalia and
Thomas JJ concurred in the judgment; Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer JJ dissenting).
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in circumstances of prior property convictions, leading to imposition of
a 50-year jail term.96
More generally, the Court has reflected that in earlier times, mandatory
sentencing (often the death penalty) held sway; however the nineteenth-
century movement away from such sentencing ‘‘marked an enlightened
introduction of flexibility into the sentencing process. It recognized that
individual culpability is not always measured by the category of crime com-
mitted. This change in sentencing practice was greeted by the Court as
a humanizing development.’’97 At the same time, the law moved away from
a focus on retribution, in favor of reformation and rehabilitation.98 Despite
these sentiments, moves to create more standardized sentencing culminated
in development of the Sentencing Guidelines providing a standard range of
penalties for particular offenses, subject to exceptions. However, these were
held to be merely advisory, rather than mandatory,99 and departures from
the guidelines subject to a broad reasonableness standard.100
The most recent Eighth Amendment cases suggest a slightly broader
reading of the prohibition than previously evident. InMiller v. Alabama the
Supreme Court found imposition of a mandatory life sentence on a juvenile
violated the Eighth Amendment.101 In so doing, it reiterated proportion-
ality in sentencing was a ‘‘basic precept of justice.’’102 This precluded
mismatches between the culpability of a class of offenders and the severity
of a penalty, and imposition of mandatory capital punishment that took no
account of the individual’s personal circumstances.103 This finding
96. Lockyer v. Andrade 538 U.S. 63 (2003) (O’Connor, for Rehnquist CJ, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas JJ) (sentence not ‘‘objectively unreasonable’’ (76): Souter Stevens
Ginsburg and Breyer JJ dissenting). The majority stated that the gross disproportionality
principle applied to ‘‘only the extraordinary case’’ (77) (and the present case was not such
a case); the minority stated that if this offender’s sentence was not disproportionate, ‘‘the
principle has no meaning’’ (83).
97. Woodson v. North Carolina 428 U.S. 280, 298 (1976) (Stewart J, for Powell and
Stevens JJ; Brennan and Marshall JJ concurred in the judgment).
98. Williams v. New York 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949) (Black J, for Vinson, Reed,
Frankfurter, Douglas, Jackson, and Burton JJ)
99. United States v. Booker, United States v. Fanfan 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
100. Kimbrough v. United States 552 U.S. 85 (2007).
101. Miller, 132 S.Ct 2455 (2012) (Kagan J, for Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Soto-
mayor JJ; Roberts CJ, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito JJ dissented).
102. Id. at 2463 (Kagan J, for Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor JJ).
103. Id.
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extended the previous finding in Roper that mandatory imposition of the
death penalty on a juvenile was offensive to the Eighth Amendment because
of the peculiar aspects relating to juveniles, such as possible impulsiveness
and recklessness, proneness to peer pressure, and the fact that character was
still being formed.104 By parity of reasoning, a mandatory life sentence on
a juvenile was also disproportionate. Their prospects for rehabilitation were
stronger than for an adult offender,105 and other goals of criminal justice,
such as retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation, had to be applied in
a manner sensitive to the offender’s age.106
The Court took a similar position in Graham v. Florida.107 Reiterating
the centrality of the principle of proportionality to the issue of cruel and
unusual punishment,108 the Court noted:
The judicial exercise of independent judgment requires consideration of the
culpability of the offenders at issue in light of their crimes and character-
istics, along with the severity of the punishment in question.109
The Court noted that, although thirty-seven states had legislated permit-
ting life sentences without parole on juveniles, in practice such penalties
were very rarely applied.110 It reiterated that punishment that did not serve
penological goals was vulnerable to Eighth Amendment challenge, and
found that a sentence of life without parole on a juvenile non-homicide
offender was not justified on any theory of criminal justice.111 Inherently,
concepts of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation had
to be applied in a manner that was sensitive to the fact that the offender was
104. Id. at 2464 (Kagan J, for Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor JJ).
105. Id. at 2465 (Kagan J, for Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor JJ).
106. Specifically, the majority noted that because retribution related to blameworthiness,
the case for retribution was weaker in the case of a juvenile offender, and that because
a juvenile offender may be more impulsive than an adult offender, the deterrent value of
a jail sentence was also weaker, and in relation to incapacitation, it was more difficult to
argue that a juvenile offender was ‘‘incorrigible’’: Id. at 2465 (Kagan J, for Kennedy,
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor JJ).
107. Graham, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), holding that a life imprisonment without parole
sentence on a juvenile offender convicted of armed burglary with assault, and attempted
robbery, was offensive to the Eighth Amendment.
108. Id. at 59 (Kennedy J, for Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor JJ).
109. Id. at 67 (Kennedy J, for Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor JJ).
110. Id. at 62 (Kennedy J, for Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor JJ).
111. Id. at 71 (Kennedy J, for Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor JJ).
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a juvenile.112 In reaching this conclusion, the Court also noted that the
practice of sentencing a juvenile convicted of a non-homicide crime to life
without parole had been ‘‘rejected the world over.’’113
It remains to be seen whether the recent decisions inMiller and Graham
will be applied more broadly to Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, or will
be confined to their factual contexts. There is much work for them to do
outside the field of juvenile offenders; it was recently noted that 27 states
currently have mandatory life-without-parole for at least one offense.114 In
principle, their reasoning—including strong re-assertion of proportionality
principles, disfavor of punishment that is not justified by any theory of
criminal justice, and disfavor of sentencing that takes no account of the
individual circumstances of the offender—is considered applicable beyond
cases involving the death penalty, and/or cases involving juveniles.
D. United Kingdom and Internationally
England has long shown concern about harsh punishments. The Magna
Carta refers to proportionality in how an individual is treated by the
criminal justice system, at a time when fines were imposed for criminal
activities.115 There are references to proportionality in sentencing in the
case law in the Middle Ages116 and the seventeenth century, once the
modern criminal justice system, including prisons, had been established.117
Section 10 of the Bill of Rights Act 1689 (Eng.) forbids cruel and unusual
punishments; shortly afterward the House of Lords found that a fine was
‘‘excessive and exorbitant [sic], against magna charta, the common right of
the subject, and the law of the land.’’118
112. Id. at 71–73 (Kennedy J, for Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor JJ).
113. Id. at 80–82 (Kennedy J, for Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor JJ).
114. Mirko Bagaric & Sandeep Gopalan, Saving the United States from Lurching to
Another Sentencing Crisis: Taking Proportionality Seriously and Implementing Fair Fixed
Penalties, 60 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 169, 182 (2016).
115. ‘‘A free man is not to be amerced for a small offence save in accordance with the
manner of the offence, and for a major offence according to its magnitude . . . earls and
barons are not to be amerced save by their peers and only in accordance with the manner of
their offence’’ (Clause 14).
116. Le Gras v. Bailiff of Bishop of Winchester, Y.B. Mich. 10, Edw. II, pl.4 (C.P., 1316).
117. Hodges v. Humkin 2 Bulst. 139, 140, 80 ER 1015, 1016 (K.B., 1615): ‘‘imprisonment
ought always to be according to the quality of the offence’’ (1316).
118. Earl of Devon’s Case, 11 State Tr. 133, 136 (1689).
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The Privy Council found Ceylonese (Sri Lankan) legislation infringed
the separation of powers principle enshrined in that country’s Constitu-
tion. One noteworthy aspect of the impugned legislation was its imposition
of a minimum mandatory jail term of 10 years’ imprisonment on those
involved in an aborted coup. In finding the legislation unconstitutional,
the Court discussed this minimum mandatory sentencing aspect:
Their aim was to ensure that the judges in dealing with these particular
persons on these particular charges were deprived of their normal discretion
as regards appropriate sentences. They were compelled to sentence each
offender on conviction to not less than ten years’ imprisonment . . . even
though his part in the conspiracy might have been trivial . . . if such Acts as
these are valid the judicial power could be wholly absorbed by the legislature
and taken out of the hands of the judges.119
In Reyes v. The Queen, the Privy Council interpreted a provision of the
Belize Constitution preventing the imposition of inhuman or degrading
punishment or other treatment to prohibit the mandatory imposition of
the death penalty. The Council concluded that ‘‘a non-judicial body can-
not decide the appropriate measure of punishment to be visited on a defen-
dant for a crime they have committed.’’120
Some challenges to minimum mandatory sentencing in the United
Kingdom have involved articles of the European Convention on Human
Rights, given the reflection of that Convention in the Human Rights Act
1998 (U.K.); specifically, Article 6, preserving the right to a fair hearing
before an independent and impartial tribunal, and Article 3, prohibiting the
use of torture, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment.
An example of a successful challenge was R (Anderson) v. Home Secre-
tary.121 There the appellant had been sentenced to mandatory life jail terms
119. Liyanage v. The Queen [1967] A.C. 259, 291 (Lord Pearce, for the Council).
120. Reyes v. The Queen [2002] 2 A.C. 235, 258 (Lord Bingham, for the Council). In
several cases the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has indicated that impo-
sition of a mandatory death penalty is inconsistent with the American Declaration of Human
Rights: Edwards v. Bahamas, 4/4/2001, Report 48/01, Downer and Tracey v. Jamaica 4/13/
2000, Report No 41/00); see also the Human Rights Committee with respect to the issue in
Saint Vincent (Thompson v. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (2000) UNDoc CCPR/C/70/
D/906/1998). The Privy Council found that a mandatory life sentence was manifestly
disproportionate, arbitrary and unconstitutional in de Boucherville v. State of Mauritius
[2008] UKPC 70.
121. R (Anderson) [2003] 1 A.C. 837.
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for murder. The legislation permitted the Home Secretary to set a mini-
mum time to be served by such offenders, known as the ‘‘tariff,’’ in con-
sultation with judges and departmental officials. The Home Secretary fixed
a tariff period greater than that recommended to him, and the appellant
challenged the consistency of the practice with the European Convention.
The House of Lords (as it then was) found in favor of the challenger.
Lord Bingham held the practice in effect amounted to a member of the
executive determining the minimum sentence that a particular prisoner
should serve; this was a judicial task, and thus Article 6 had been brea-
ched.122 Lord Steyn agreed only a court could determine the punishment
of a convicted person, and this had been the position since at least 1688, and
was required by the rule of law.123 Lord Hutton said the Home Secretary’s
power was difficult to reconcile with separation of powers principles.124
The European Court has applied a ‘‘gross disproportionality’’ test to deter-
mine whether a sentence amounts to inhuman or degrading punishment
contrary to Article 3.125 Further, continued imprisonment may be problem-
aticwhere it no longer effectively serves any legitimate penological purpose,126
bearing in mind that rehabilitation is reflected in international norms and has
become more important.127 The Court has spoken negatively about manda-
tory sentencing regimes, acknowledging they deprive the defendant of placing
mitigating or special circumstances before the court,128 and that for this
reason, they are ‘‘much more likely’’ to be grossly disproportionate.129 A life
122. Id. at 880 (with whom Lord Nicholls (883), Lord Hobhouse (901), Lord Scott (902)
and Lord Rodger (902) agreed).
123. Id. at 890–91 (with whom Lord Nicholls (883), Lord Scott (902) and Lord Rodger
(902) agreed).
124. Id. at 899 (with whom Lord Nicholls (883), Lord Hobhouse (901), Lord Scott (902)
and Lord Rodger (902) agreed). In R v. Offen [2001] 1 W.L.R. 253, 276–77, the Court of
Appeal indicated that a provision mandating the imposition of a life sentence on a repeat
offender might offend Article 3 of the European Convention by being arbitrary and
disproportionate.
125. Harkins and Edwards v. United Kingdom [2012] ECHR 45, [133]; Vinter v. United
Kingdom [2013] ECHR 645, [102](Grand Chamber); Murray v. Netherlands [2016] ECHR
408, [99](Grand Chamber).
126. Harkins and Edwards, [2012] ECHR 45, [138]; Vinter, [2013] ECHR 645, [111];
Murray, [2016] ECHR 408, [100](Grand Chamber).
127. Murray, [2016] ECHR 408, [102](Grand Chamber).
128. Harkins and Edwards, [2012] ECHR 45, [138].
129. Id. at [2012] ECHR 45, [138].
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sentence without the possibility of parole is likely to infringe Article 3 (and
Article 5) of the European Convention as being arbitrary and disproportion-
ate.130 If release from life imprisonment is based on evidence the person
detained has been rehabilitated, the statemust provide the treatment necessary
for rehabilitation to take place; failure to do so breaches Article 3.131 It may be
noted that the successful challenges to minimum mandatory sentencing laws
under the EuropeanConvention have tended to target extreme laws involving
life imprisonment without parole, in contrast to Canada, for instance, where
laws providing for imprisonment of less than 10 years have been struck out on
proportionality and arbitrariness grounds.
Courts have found minimum mandatory sentencing provisions to be
unconstitutional in, for example, India,132 Sri Lanka,133 South Africa,134
Mauritius.135 and Papua New Guinea.136
130. R v. Lichniak [2003] 1 A.C. 903, 909 (Lord Bingham) (with whom Lord Nicholls
(913), Lord Steyn (914), Lord Hobhouse (919), Lord Scott (919) and Lord Rodger (919)
agreed); R (Wellington) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] 1 A.C. 335.
131. Murray, [2016] ECHR 408.
132. Mithu v. State of Punjab [1983] 2 SCR 690, ‘‘a provision of law which deprives the
court of the use of its wise and beneficent discretion in a matter of life and death, without
regard to the circumstances in which the offence was committed and, therefore, without
regard to the gravity of the offence, cannot but be regarded as harsh, unjust and unfair’’
(704) (Articles 14 and 21 of the Indian Constitution regarding equality of treatment and
punishment according to law).
133. The court found that minimum mandatory punishment was cruel, inhuman, and
degrading: Re Supreme Court Special Determination Nos 6 and 7 of 1998 [1999] 2 LRC 579.
134. S v. Makwanyane [1995](3) SA 391, 433: ‘‘proportionality is an ingredient to be taken
into account in deciding whether a penalty is cruel, inhuman or degrading’’; The State v.
Thoms [1990](2) SA 802 (A), commenting that mandatory sentencing ‘‘reduces the court’s
normal sentencing function to the level of a rubber stamp. It negates the ideal of indi-
vidualization. The morally just and the morally reprehensible are treated alike. Extenuating
and aggravating factors both count for nothing’’; the country’s highest court read down an
indeterminate sentence given to a repeat offender from an indeterminate sentence to a 15-
year maximum on the basis of disproportionality, in that a non-violent offender could
otherwise be jailed for life.
135. State v. Philibert [2007] SCJ 274, where the Supreme Court of Mauritius found
a mandatory 45-year jail term for murder was disproportionate and invalid.
136. In Papua New Guinea (Special Constitutional Reference No1 of 1984: Re Minimum
Penalties Legislation) [1985] LRC (Const) 984 PNGLR 314, three judges said such provisions
amounted to cruel punishment and/or arbitrary decision making, contrary to the Consti-
tution; minimum mandatory sentences have been found contrary to constitutional bars on
cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment in The State v. Vries [1997] 4 LRC 1 and The
State v. Likuwa [2000] 1 LRC 600.
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I I : THEMES IN THE MANDATORY SENTENC ING DEBATE
Several themes are relevant in the case law discussed above that has consid-
ered mandatory sentencing regimes. They include: questions regarding the
status of arbitrariness in lawmaking and legal outcomes; questions regarding
proportionality and gross disproportionality, including their meaning, indi-
cia, and status in discussion of notions of what is ‘‘cruel and unusual’’; the
relevance of the goals of the criminal justice system in determining the
validity of minimum mandatory sentencing provisions; and the interplay
between such regimes and constitutional doctrines like the separation of
powers principle. These themes are now considered in more depth below.
A. Arbitrariness versus Rule of Law
Law and society have long struggled with exercise of power characterized by
arbitrariness. English monarchs could unilaterally suspend the operation of
a law, or exempt an individual from it. This tended to give discretion a bad
name.137 According to some legal historians, at least, it was the arbitrariness
of the purported (ab)use of power (by both the monarch and the judiciary)
in the late seventeenth-century in England138 that led to the admonition
against cruel and unusual punishment (together with abolition of the
monarch’s dispensation power) in the Bill of Rights Act 1689 (Eng.), and
led to its adoption in United States colonies, the United States Bill of
Rights, and subsequently in human rights instruments around the world
in later centuries. Arbitrary use of monarchical power underpinned the
Glorious Revolution of 1688. The rule of law, together with the separation
of powers principles, was one of the supposed antidotes to dangers or
arbitrariness in the exercise of power. Arbitrary exercise of power is usually
proscribed in international human rights provisions.139
It has been something of a paradox that dissatisfaction has grown with
the exercise by judges of discretionary sentencing powers. Inevitably, the
137. ‘‘Abuse of the royal dispensing or suspending power made the idea of dispensation as
a means of individualised application of law odious in the English-speaking world’’: Roscoe
Pound, Discretion, Dispensation and Mitigation: The Problem of the Individual Special Case,
35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 925, 930 (1960).
138. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 448
(1765–1769).
139. For example, Article 9(1) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and
Article 9 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
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criticism has been that judges have been ‘‘too soft’’ on offenders, or that
they had ‘‘too much’’ power.140 Another common criticism is that there is
wild inconsistency and unpredictability in sentencing.141 This led to calls
for greater uniformity in sentencing, including the development of the
Sentencing Guidelines in the United States, and increased use of manda-
tory sentencing legislation in the United States and elsewhere around the
world. The inevitable result has been massive increases in prison popula-
tion numbers, and the associated economic and social cost.142
The problem is that these developments have not removed the charac-
teristic of arbitrariness in sentencing. Even if the Sentencing Guidelines
(though interpreted eventually as merely advisory)143 did produce greater
uniformity in sentencing, and even if mandatory sentencing did the same,
both of which are highly contestable claims, they have simply had the effect
of shifting the arbitrariness in the decision making from the judiciary to the
legislature.144 Legislation containing mandatory penalties for particular
behavior is, by definition, arbitrary, because it cannot take into account
the particular circumstances in which a particular offense has been com-
mitted, and the existence of mitigating or aggravating factors, explanations,
or nuance in the circumstances.145 Prosecutors often have broad discretion
140. Rachel Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional Role in an
Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 84, 88 (2004).
141. Id. at 88; U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION, REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANDATORY
MINIMUMS IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 85 (2011).
142. Mary Price, Mill(er)ing Mandatory Minimums: What Federal Lawmakers Should
Take from Miller v. Alabama, 78 MO. L. REV. 1147 (2013), notes the number of defendants
subject to mandatory minimums has increased from 6681 in 1990 to 19,896 in 2010. Using an
average per annum cost to detain a prisoner of approximately $28,000, and an average
minimum mandatory sentence length of almost 12 years, she estimates that all prisoners
subject to a minimummandatory sentence cost $5,627,416,473.60 to house; see also Nathan
James, Congressional Research Service, R42937, The Federal Prison Population Buildup:
Overview, Policy Changes, Issues and Options (2013). Recently Congress has moved to reduce
some mandatory minimum sentences: Smarter Sentencing Act 2015.
143. Booker v. United States 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
144.William Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100MICH. L. REV. 505, 586
(2002): ‘‘the Guidelines are arbitrary; morally similar cases yield very different sentences.’’
145. ‘‘The life of today is too complex and its circumstances are too varied and too
variable to make possible, in practice, reduction to rules of everything with which the regime
of justice according to law must deal’’: Pound, supra note 137, at 927; Stephen Schulhofer,
Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 199, 221 (1993): ‘‘uniformity
backfires because true mandatoriness produces pervasive inequity.’’
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regarding who will be charged with offenses attracting the mandatory
minimum sentence, and use this as a bargaining chip in plea bargain
negotiations.146 This prosecutorial discretion inevitably leads to arbitrary
outcomes.147 Racial minorities and the economically or socially disadvan-
taged may be particularly unfairly impacted.148
History should have taught us the illusion of uniformity promised by
supposedly mandatory, inflexible rules.149 Langbein noted, of a time when
English law provided every felony offender shall be hanged, that ‘‘no
feature of English criminal law became more notorious, or aroused more
indignation, than the nominally capital character of small thefts.’’150
Development of the jury system in England in the fourteenth century
provided flexibility in the application of the law. History shows us that
during the time when the United Kingdom had a large number of offenses
attracting a mandatory death penalty, jurors found ways to acquit the
accused, even if they believed them to be guilty—the so-called ‘‘pious
perjurer’’ jurors, to avoid what they considered unfair, disproportionate
penalties.151 The common law developed the ‘‘benefit of clergy’’ doctrine,
again softening the offender’s punishment from what it otherwise might
have been.152 Judges continue to note that a consequence of minimum
mandatory sentence provisions is juror reluctance to convict.153 The some-
times harsh outcomes of strict application of common law rules were
obviated by courts of equity, providing discretionary remedies and
146. This was noted by Dickson CJ and Lamer in R v. Smith [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045, 1083;
and by McLachlin CJ, Le Bel, Abella, Cromwell, Karakatsanis, and Gascon JJ in R v. Nur
[2015] 1 S.C.R. 774, 820.
147. Gary Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness of
Determinate Sentencing Reform, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 61, 107–10 (1993); U.S. SENT’G COM-
MISSION, supra note 141, at 96.
148. U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION, supra note 141, at 101.
149. ‘‘All legal systems which have endured have had to develop, by experience, prin-
ciples of exercise of discretion’’: Pound, supra note 137, at 927.
150. John Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A View from the
Ryder Sources, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 36 (1983).
151. Michael Tonry, The Mostly Unintended Effects of Mandatory Penalties: Two Centuries
of Consistent Findings, 38 CRIME & JUST. 65, 72 (2009). There are also suggestions this
practice was followed at a time when the Sentencing Guidelines were considered manda-
tory, jurors on occasion refusing to convict because they believed the sentence that would
apply if they found the accused guilty to be unjust: Barkow, supra note 140, at 80.
152. Langbein, supra note 150, at 38; Manderson & Sharp, supra note 41, at 619–20.
153. R v. Smith [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045, 1081 (Dickson CJ and Lamer J).
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permitting courts to ‘‘do justice.’’ If the definition of insanity is doing the
same thing over and over and expecting a different result, it is regrettable
that our lawmakers have not learned the lesson of history that it is ill-
advised to seek to achieve certain legal outcomes by imposing mandatory,
inflexible rules. Either other pieces in the system will work to subvert this
plan,154 or gross injustice will result,155 or both.
In terms of the separation of powers principles as applied to the criminal
justice system (to be discussed later in this article), this doctrine is designed to
operate so as to avoid arbitrary exercise of power. This is why bills of
attainder are prohibited. Legislatures can create certain crimes, and provide
guidelines about what appropriate sentences might be for those who commit
such crimes. The executive, in the form of the police, enforces these laws.
But it is the judicial arm that determines whether or not a person is guilty,
whether the person has been accorded procedural fairness, and the punish-
ment that the offender should receive for committing the crime. This sep-
aration of functions serves to reduce the risk of an arbitrary exercise of power
by any of the arms of government, providing needed checks and balances.156
We interfere with this delicate system of criminal justice at our peril.
B. Disproportionality and Gross Disproportionality
The idea that the punishment should fit the crime is as old as Western
civilization.157
The concept of proportionality as applied to sentencing is axiomatic.158
It appears in the Code of Hammurabi, traced to 1760 BC.159 It has Biblical
154. For example, by the use of judicial discretion. For instance, the United States
Sentencing Commission concluded that existing minimum mandatory provisions regarding
child pornography offenses ‘‘may be excessively severe and as a result (emphasis added) are
being applied inconsistently’’: U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION, supra note 141, at 365.
155. ‘‘Unbending rules rigidly administered may not merely fail to do justice, they may do
positive injustice’’: Pound, supra note 137, at 928.
156. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV.
1127 (2000).
157. John Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 899, 927 (2011).
158. Weems v. United States 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910) (McKenna J, for the Court); the
Australian High Court referred to it as a ‘‘basic principle’’ of sentencing law: Hoare v. The
Queen (1989) 167 CLR 348, 354 (Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, and McHugh JJ).
159.Morris Fish, Proportionality as a Moral Principle of Punishment, 28OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 57 (2008).
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roots in the book of Exodus160 and Leviticus.161 Aristotle viewed inequality
as a synonym for injustice.162 Notions of proportionality in punishment
are evident during the reign of Edward the Confessor (1042–1066) in
England.163 It appears in Magna Carta after the king had abandoned
well-established proportionality principles in a pragmatic revenue-raising
exercise. The writ de moderata misericordia was used in the thirteenth and
fourteenth centuries to successfully challenge harsh penalties.164 A preface to
a 1553 statute reflects proportionality principles,165 and an early seventeenth-
century English case includes statements on proportionality.166 At least one
of the targets of the ‘‘cruel and unusual punishment’’ prohibition in the 1689
Bill of Rights was disproportionate penalties.167 The doctrine finds impres-
sive intellectual support in the eighteenth century.168 Notwithstanding this,
in the eighteenth century English criminal law contained a large number of
160. Exodus 20:23–25: ‘‘you are to take life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for
hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, bruise for bruise.’’
161. Leviticus 24:20: ‘‘fracture for fracture, eye for eye, tooth for tooth.’’
162. ‘‘What the judge aims at doing is to make the parts equal by the penalty . . .
impose(d)’’: ETHICS 148–49 (Penguin Classics ed., 1955).
163. ‘‘We do forbid that a person shall be condemned to death for a trifling offence. But
for the correction of the multitude, extreme punishment shall be inflicted according to the
nature and extent of the offence’’: BOYD C. BARRINGTON, THE MAGNA CARTA AND
OTHER GREAT CHARTERS OF ENGLAND 181, 199 (1900).
164. 3 MATTHEW PARIS, ENGLISH HISTORY FROM THE YEAR 1235 TO 1273, 444 (J.A.
Giles trans., 1854); Le Gras v. Bailiff of Bishop of Winchester, Y.B 10 Edw. 2, pl 4 (C.P.,
1316), reprinted in 20 SELDEN SOCIETY 3 (1934); Stinneford, supra note 157, at 929–30.
165. ‘‘And Laws also justly made for the preservation of the Commonwealth, without
extreme punishment or great Penalty, are more often for the most part obeyed and kept’’: 1
Mary 1, c.1 (1553).
166. ‘‘Imprisonment ought always to be according to the quality of the offense’’: Hodges v.
Humkin 2 Bulst. 139, 140, 80 ER 1015 (K.B., 1615) (Croke J). I am grateful to the work of
Anthony Granucci for bringing these primary sources to my attention: ‘‘Nor Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Inflicted:’’ The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 846–47 (1969).
167. Granucci, id. at 860.
168. For example, Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishment 43–44 (W. Paolucci ed.,
1963) referred to the ‘‘essential proportion’’ between the crime and the punishment;
Montesquieu similarly recognized the essentiality of proportionality (The Spirit of the Laws
87 (1748)), as did Sir William Blackstone (supra note 138, at 3), ‘‘the wise legislator will mark
the principle divisions, and not assign penalties of the first degree to offenses of an inferior
rank’’ (12); see also generally Deborah Schwartz and Jay Wishingrad, The Eighth Amend-
ment, Beccaria, and the Enlightenment: An Historical Justification for the Weems v. United
States Excessive Punishment Doctrine, 24 BUFF. L. REV. 783 (1975); see also Immanuel Kant,
The Philosophy of Law: An Exposition of the Fundamental Principles of Jurisprudence as the
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offenses that carried mandatory penalties, including death, although as noted
above, in practice this was ameliorated through a combination of the jury
system, actions by the judiciary, and doctrines such as the ‘‘benefit of clergy.’’
Of course, there is a link between the risk of disproportional sentences
and minimum mandatory sentences.169 As Stuntz put it, ‘‘it seems hardly
surprising that sentencing rules devised in the abstract lead to ‘tougher’
sentencing practices. The abstraction means those devising the rules need
not look hard at the individuals they are sentencing to prison.’’170 The
United States Sentencing Commission criticized the existing minimum
mandatory system on the basis that aspects of it ‘‘apply too broadly, are
set too high, or both, to warrant the prescribed minimum penalty for the
full range of offenders who could be prosecuted.’’171
Judges should, and must, be prepared to apply a robust doctrine of
disproportionality in assessing whether particular sentences breach the
requirement. It is hardly necessary to justify the fact that punishments and
sentences must be proportional to the crimes with which they deal. It
makes intuitive sense; it appeals to an ordinary person’s sense of fair play.
Not surprisingly, it is a doctrine of ancient vintage in our civil and political
society. Of course, a judicial system delivering results that do not accord
with society’s sense of fair play is vulnerable to losing the support and
confidence of the people, which imperils even more important objectives
than justice to a particular individual. A justice system not generally
respected and supported by the people is fatally undermined.172
Science of Right 198 (W. Hastie transl., 1887/1974): ‘‘a sentence can be pronounced over all
criminals proportionate to their internal wickedness.’’
169. This was noted by the Judicial Conference of the United States. It commented that
the effect of minimum mandatory sentences was that ‘‘a severe penalty that might be
appropriate for the most egregious of offenders will likewise be required for the least cul-
pable violator . . . the ramification for this less culpable offender can be quite stark, as such an
offender will often be serving a sentence that is greatly disproportionate to his or her conduct’’:
U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION, supra note 141, at 92. The Report refers to a Department of
Justice submission acknowledging ‘‘significant excesses’’ in the system of minimum manda-
tory penalties (93).
170. Stuntz, supra note 144, at 587.
171. U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION, supra note 141, at 345.
172. The Law Council of Australia’s Policy Discussion Paper on Mandatory Sentencing
(2014) criticizes the use of such sentencing practice for many reasons, including that it
‘‘wrongly undermines the community’s confidence in the judiciary and the criminal justice
system as a whole’’ (4).
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Although it is appropriate that the judiciary defers to legislative judg-
ment to some extent in the field of criminal justice, they have a constitu-
tional duty (in some jurisdictions) and are bound by human rights
instruments elsewhere to avoid cruel and unusual punishments. There is
strong historical evidence that such admonition was not confined to meth-
ods of punishment,173 and included considerations of proportionality in
sentencing.174
It has been seen in Part I that each of the jurisdictions studied applies
a principle of proportionality, to a greater or lesser extent, in assessing the
constitutional validity of sentences. In Canada, R v. Nur provides a recent
example of the Court striking down a minimummandatory sentencing law
on the basis of disproportionality through its § 1 analysis, as has occurred in
the United States in Graham and Miller in the context of the Eighth
Amendment. In the author’s view, a sensible application of the concept
of ‘‘gross proportionality’’ or ‘‘proportionality,’’ taking into account rele-
vant factors like the gravity of the offense, circumstances of the offender
and the offense, comparable sentences elsewhere, and purposes of impris-
onment, would mean that sentences of mandatory life for small-time,
though repeated, property crime,175 a 40-year jail term for possession and
sale of drugs,176 mandatory life without parole for drug possession,177 a 25-
year jail term under a three-strikes law for theft of $1200 worth of golf clubs
(with circumstances of past property crime convictions),178 and a total 50-
year jail term under a three-strikes law for theft of $200 worth of videotapes
(with circumstances of past property crime convictions)179 would be
unconstitutional. Frankly, it is difficult to accept that some jurists would
find such sentences not grossly disproportionate to the crime. It certainly
suggests the practical impossibility of meeting the standard in the context
of non-capital crimes.180 It is difficult to identify what penological purpose
173. Cf Harmelin v. Michigan 501 U.S. 957. 979 (Scalia J, with whom Rehnquist CJ
agreed) (1991).
174. Earl of Devon’s Case, 11 State Tr. 133, 136 (1689).
175. Rummel v. Estelle 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
176. Hutto v. Davis 454 U.S. 370 (1982).
177. Harmelin, 501 U.S. 957(1991).
178. Ewing v. California 538 U.S. 11 (2003).
179. Lockyer v. Andrade 538 U.S. 63 (2003).
180. Carol Steiker and Jordan Steiker refer to the ‘‘insurmountable hurdle for Eighth
Amendment challenges to long prison terms’’: Opening a Window or Building a Wall? The
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is served with such sentences. As has been discussed above, in a range of
jurisdictions this conclusion is typically an indicator that the sentence
breaches constitutional and human rights norms.
Clearly, the United States Supreme Court has been much more pre-
pared to uphold Eighth Amendment challenges in capital cases, compared
with non-capital cases. The strongly bifurcated attitude of the United
States Supreme Court to Eighth Amendment challenges, according to
whether a capital punishment or non-capital punishment is imposed, is
very difficult to support. Pithy statements that ‘‘death is different’’ do not
make the argument. Clearly, nothing in the text of the Eighth Amendment
justifies such a different approach to capital and non-capital cases. The
Court says that it is applying the same test of gross disproportionality, and
is concerned with arbitrariness, and with punishment that does not reflect
any penological theory. Reasoning applied to argue that imposition of the
death penalty in a particular case would be offensive to the Eighth Amend-
ment is equally applicable, but strangely ignored, in the context of the
imposition of an extremely daunting custodial sentence.181 Criticism of
this strictly bifurcated approach to Eighth Amendment case law is already
widespread,182 so will not be elaborated upon here.
To the extent that comparative sentence consideration is relevant when
considering proportionality, there is evidence that the Australian minimum
mandatory sentences applied to ‘‘people-smugglers’’ is highly dispropor-
tional. As noted above, this regime imposes a minimum mandatory sen-
tence of three-to-five-year jail terms. In contrast, of 515 individuals
convicted of people smuggling prior to the introduction of the legislation,
just 39 were sentenced at or above the now-prescribed mandatory level of
Effect of Eighth Amendment Death Penalty Law and Advocacy on Criminal Justice More
Broadly, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 186 (2009).
181. Michael O’Hear, Just Kid Stuff? Extending Graham and Miller to Adults, 78 MO. L.
REV. 1087 (2013).
182. Rachel Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional
Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1146 (2009): ‘‘in non-
capital cases . . . the Court has done virtually nothing to ensure that the sentence is appro-
priate. Mandatory punishments proliferate with no attention to an individual’s particular
culpability, sentences are frequently disproportionate given the actual conduct and culpa-
bility of the offender, and arbitrariness abounds’’; Steiker and Steiker lament the ‘‘jarring
contrast’’ in the application of the Eighth Amendment to capital and non-capital cases: supra
note 180, at 188.
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imprisonment.183 Yet in the very same case where the Australian High
Court recognizes that ‘‘the sentence imposed must be proportionate,’’184 it
then proceeds to validate legislative regime applying to people smuggling
that clearly, according to the statistics, results in disproportionate
sentencing.
C. What Purpose Lengthy Minimum Jail Terms?
Deprivation of a person against their will is one of the most serious steps
that a state can take against an individual. Clearly, it is highly invasive of
that person’s liberty in a state that generally accepts freedom of will, free-
dom of association, and so on. As a result, clear and careful justification
must be provided for the fact of, conditions of, and length of such incar-
ceration. In criminal justice circles, typical rationales for state responses
such as incarceration have included deterrence, retribution, incapacitation,
and rehabilitation. So while, and to the extent that, one or more of these
goals justifies incarceration, little concern is raised. However, as the cases,
particularly in the United States,185 Canada,186 and Europe,187 have
reflected, difficulties arise when incarceration cannot, or can no longer,
be justified on any of these grounds. It is at this point that serious questions
are asked regarding whether such incarceration is cruel and unusual, arbi-
trary, or otherwise contrary to human rights norms.
Applying these considerations to minimum mandatory sentencing
regimes, researchers have noted that reducing prison terms does not nec-
essarily relate to an increase in recidivism.188 There is also abundant evi-
dence to suggest that the imposition of minimum mandatory jail terms
does not deter criminal behavior.189 Proportionality is again relevant here,
it being noted that:
183. Andrew Trotter & Matt Garozzo, Mandatory Sentencing for People Smuggling: Issues
of Law and Policy, 36 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 553, 564 (2012).
184. Magaming v. The Queen (2013) 252 CLR 381, 397 (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan,
Kiefel, and Bell JJ) (emphasis added).
185. Graham v. Florida 560 U.S. 48, 71 (2010).
186. R v. Nur [2015] 1 S.C.R. 773, 823.
187. Harkins and Edwards v. UK [2012] ECHR 45, [138].
188. Todd Clear & James Austin, Reducing Mass Incarceration: Implications of the Iron
Law of Prison Populations, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 307, 309–311 (2009).
189. Schulhofer, supra note 145; Stephen Schulhofer & Ilene Nagel, Negotiating Pleas
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The First Fifteen Months 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231
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Punishments may now be rendered self-defeating through disproportional-
ity. The goal of deterrence, which is as critical to the project of incarceration
today as it was in the 1820s, cannot adequately be achieved if there is no
relationship whatsoever between offenses and the lengths of prison
sentences.190
As has been pointed out elsewhere, there are highly questionable as-
sumptions involved in any thesis linking reductions in crime rates with
tougher and/or mandatory sentences, including that would-be criminals
are rational actors who calmly weigh the expected benefits of their criminal
behavior with the risk of being caught, and that they are actually aware of
the likely sentence they will receive if proven guilty.191 And it is most
unlikely that a system of long minimum mandatory sentences claims reha-
bilitation to be one of its goals.192
Recent research on the minimum mandatory sentencing provisions
applicable to so-called people smugglers, often ferrying asylum seekers to
Australia by boat via Indonesia, suggests most of those affected by the
legislation and subject to minimum three-to-five-year jail terms are uned-
ucated, poor, and illiterate Indonesians, often pressured into committing
(1989); Paul Cassell, Too Severe? A Defense of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and a Critique
of Federal Mandatory Minimums, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1017 (2004); Ian Weinstein, Fifteen Years
After the Federal Sentencing Revolution: How Mandatory Minimums Have Undermined
Effective and Just Narcotics Sentencing, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 87 (2003); VALERIE WRIGHT,
DETERRENCE IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: EVALUATING CERTAINTY VERSUS SEVERITY OF
PUNISHMENT (2010) (Sentencing Project); N. Morgan, Mandatory Sentences in Australia:
Where Have we Been and Where are we Going?, 24 CRIM. L.J. 164 (2004); Anthony Doob &
Carla Cesaroni, The Political Attractiveness of Mandatory Minimum Sentences, 39 OSGOOD
HALL L.J. 287 (2001); OLIVER ROEDER ET AL., WHAT CAUSED THE CRIME DECLINE?
(Brennan Centre for Justice, 2015): ‘‘since 2000, the effect on the crime rate of increasing
incarceration . . . has been essentially zero’’ (4).
190. Note: The Eighth Amendment, Proportionality and the Changing Meaning of
‘‘Punishments,’’ 122 HARV. L. REV. 960, 978 (2009); Sir Leon Radzionwicz & Roger Hood,
Judicial Discretion and Sentencing Standards: Victorian Attempts to Solve a Perennial Problem,
127 U. PA. L. REV. 1288, 1294 (1979), noted the classic penological view that ‘‘deterrence, in
order to be effective, must be related as closely as possible to degrees and shades of guilt.’’
191. Sara Taylor, Unlocking the Gates of Desolation Row, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1810, 1852–53
(2012).
192. ‘‘Determinate sentencing’s principal goal has been the elimination of unwarranted
disparity . . . accordingly, most jurisdictions have abandoned rehabilitation, once the central
purpose of the indeterminate sentence, as a principal end of punishment’’: Lowenthal, supra
note 147, at 63.
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a crime, or unaware of the purposes for which their services are sought,
then being taken out to sea and told what they will be doing, where they
might feel unable to refuse. They are typically not aware of the minimum
mandatory penalties their stewardship of the vessel will attract.193 And,
though the flow of boats travelling to Australia has indeed stopped, this is
because of new government policies, contentious in themselves, to the
effect that no one who arrives in Australia irregularly by boat will be settled
in the country, regardless of whether they can show they are a refugee or
not, and because of a government policy of towing back boats with refugee
seekers to the country of origin (subject to a non-refoulement obligation).
The introduction of minimum mandatory penalties has not caused the
boats to stop, and adherents of minimum mandatory penalties cannot use
this example to assert that such penalties deter undesired behavior.
And this meets the objections that appear in some of the American case
law,194 and in the High Court of Australia,195 that there is no objective
basis upon which a court can determine whether or not a particular pun-
ishment is harsh, unjust, cruel, or disproportionate. Judges sometimes
express concern that, in the guise of applying notions of ‘‘proportionality,’’
some courts will, because such a concept has no inherent firm meaning, use
this doctrine essentially to impose whatever penalties they see fit, regardless
of what the legislature has prescribed.
The answer is that a sentence is ‘‘cruel and unusual’’ and/or dispropor-
tionate where it cannot be seriously argued that detention for that length of
time, or continued detention, meets any legitimate penological objective.
So a 40- or 50-year jail term for a non-violent, though repeat, offender may
not serve any legitimate objective. If the offender is ‘‘deterrable,’’ a much
shorter jail term would likely have achieved the goal. It does not take 40 to
50 years to rehabilitate a wrongdoer (assuming that the criminal justice
system makes a serious attempt to do so). And it is hard to justify such
193. Trotter & Garozzo, supra note 183; ‘‘there is . . . no evidence to suggest that the
prosecution of people smugglers in Australia has had any measurable deterrent effect on
those most commonly engaging in or likely to engage in smuggling activities’’: Andreas
Schloenhardt & Colin Craig, Prosecutions of People-Smugglers in Australia 2011–2014, 38
SYDNEY L. REV. 49, 82 (2016).
194. Harmelin v. Michigan 501 U.S. 957, 988 (1991) (Scalia J, with whom Rehnquist CJ
agreed).
195. Magaming v. The Queen (2013) 252 CLR 381, 397 (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan,
Kiefel, and Bell JJ); 414 (Keane J).
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a lengthy jail term as truly legitimate ‘‘punishment’’ for non-violent crime.
Clearly, incarceration is one of the most invasive interferences with an
individual’s liberty, and it must be closely and comprehensively justified.
Again, the Canadian Court has been most willing to apply this theory to set
aside minimum mandatory sentencing laws. In Europe, the argument has
(to date) only been accepted in relation to life sentences, whereas it might
equally be applied to sentences of shorter duration.
D. Arguments in Favor of the Constitutional Validity of Minimum
Mandatory Sentencing Regimes
It should be conceded that legislatures are entitled to deference in relation
to decisions they make regarding the criminal law. Legislatures are account-
able to the people, and the community is entitled to ask its representatives
to enact policy prescriptions that will make society as safe as possible and to
minimize criminal behavior. Legislators are charged with the complex task
of weighing a multitude of interests and values in determining the content
of their jurisdiction’s criminal laws. Legislators are entitled to make deci-
sions regarding whether they value punishment more highly than rehabil-
itation, whether they believe tougher sentences will reduce crime, whether,
and to what extent, repeat offenders should be treated more harshly than
first-time offenders. Their choices are entitled to judicial respect and def-
erence. Criminologists and sociologists, and non-experts, will have their
views on the best policy prescriptions to deal with criminal behavior, and
people will legitimately disagree on what works and what does not.
As the United States Supreme Court has noted, the Constitution does
not reflect any particular theory of criminal justice, and legislators are prima
facie free to pursue particular theories and policies in this regard. The same
may be said of the Canadian Charter, the Australian Constitution, and the
European Convention on Human Rights. This freedom will be more easily
observable in jurisdictions that embrace a federal structure, including the
United States, Australia, and Europe, with state legislatures196 pursuing
196. However, note that § 91 of the Canadian Constitution 1867 gives the federal gov-
ernment of that country constitutional power with respect to criminal law; this is in contrast
with the United States and Australia, where criminal law is primarily a state constitutional
responsibility. In Europe, member countries generally have the power to legislate their own
criminal laws.
424 | NEW CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | VOL . 20 | NO . 3 | SUMMER 2017
a range of policy prescriptions in the criminal justice space, placing differ-
ent weight on different theories of punishment.
It should be conceded that members of society are often fearful of levels
of criminal activity, and legislators will face pressure to ‘‘get tough’’ on
criminal offending. One of the ways in which they might do so is to
introduce high minimum mandatory jail terms, often on the basis of
a perception that judges are ‘‘too soft’’ on offenders. Of course, this per-
ception is inherently subjective in itself, and may or may not be based on
knowledge of all of the facts of particular cases, knowledge of the costs
(financial and otherwise) of incarceration, and/or an understanding of the
limitations of incarceration as a criminal justice tool, and so on. And it
should be admitted that, on occasion, judges impose sentences that many
people think is ‘‘too soft’’ and that do not reflect community values. It is
accepted that legislators sometimes face real pressure to respond to com-
munity concern about perceived high crime levels, and that judges should
commence with a position of deference to the criminal justice policy op-
tions that particular legislators may have chosen within a jurisdiction.
Further, one of the reasons why legislators may be pushed to consider
the introduction of minimum mandatory sentences is that some may
believe that the sentencing process is something of a lottery, with wide
disparity in sentencing outcomes for different offenders, dependent on the
judge or court involved. This may have been exacerbated by the fact that it
has sometimes been extremely difficult to practically appeal sentences
thought to be contrary to past relevant precedents. No attorney or legal
scholar would want a system where the outcome of sentencing discretion
was unpredictable and idiosyncratic. In that light, a policy of minimum
mandatory sentencing has understandable appeal, even if it is a false solu-
tion, because the minimum mandatory sentencing regime does not remove
the discretion and uncertainty in the system; it simply transfers it else-
where, to a place that may be less visible.
Further, it might be argued that some judges have pushed the Eighth
Amendment jurisdiction too far, setting aside sentences on the basis that
they disagree with the sentence imposed, rather than, in truth, on accept-
able constitutional grounds around ‘‘cruel and unusual.’’ And some might
criticize use of the ‘‘proportionality’’ test in Eighth Amendment cases on
the basis it gives reviewing judges too much discretion to do just that, in
effect, given that the test may be said to be inherently uncertain in meaning
and subject to a wide degree of interpretation. Some may argue that, for
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this reason, Eighth Amendment review should be limited to methods of
punishment only; obviously, if this were the position, harsh minimum
terms of imprisonment could not be the subject of a successful constitu-
tional challenge. Alternatively, they may interpret the test of ‘‘gross dis-
proportionality’’ so narrowly that effectively no custodial sentence meets it.
Again, if this were the position, harsh minimum terms of imprisonment
could not be successfully constitutionally challenged. This would at least
create greater certainty in the application of the Eighth Amendment, would
effectively take any suggestion of subjectivity out of Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence, and would reflect very strong deference to the policy choices
of the democratically elected legislature.
On the other hand, community clamor for strong action against those
perceived as wrongdoers is not new. The genius of those who designed the
Bill of Rights and other international human rights instruments was to
recognize, and to get enough others to agree, that all societies were
vulnerable to such outcry, but that there were some principles that stood,
or that should stand, above the fray. They were not negotiable. Anyone
accused of wrongdoing would have the right to due process, regardless of
how bad the wrong they were alleged to have committed.197 And, it is
submitted, anyone actually convicted of a crime, and liable to punish-
ment, has a right not to be subject to cruel and unusual punishment, even
when convicted in circumstances of aggravation, such as a serious crime
or a repeat offender.
There is a balance of competing roles. On the one hand, there is the
right of a legislator to define what is criminal and to legislate for punish-
ment for those found guilty of the defined crime. On the other, the courts
must apply and uphold the Constitution and fundamental human rights
standards, including the right not to be punished disproportionately. Legal
systems have sought to ward against the imposition of disproportionate
sentences for centuries. Of course, scholars and judges will have different
views as to the extent of deference owed to the legislature, and the robust-
ness with which constitutional and human rights standards should be
enforced. However, the court stands between the legislator, which might
be tempted to subvert due process or to mandate draconian penalties for
197. Hamdi v. Rumseld 543 U.S. 507, 532 (2004): ‘‘it is during our most challenging and
uncertain moments that our Nation’s commitment to due process is most severely tested’’
(O’Connor J, for Rehnquist CJ, Kennedy, and Breyer JJ).
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populist ends, and the individual. It is a court’s constitutional duty to
prevent legislative overreach, however popular that overreach might be.
Sometimes, as the drafters of the Bill of Rights knew, the will of the
majority does not reflect what is right.
E. Mandatory Minimum Sentences Infringe the Principle
of Separation of Powers
It is axiomatic that sentencing is an exclusively judicial function.198 This
creates a potential constitutional argument against minimum mandatory
sentencing regimes in jurisdictions that recognize the principle of a separa-
tion of powers between the legislature, executive, and judiciary.199 It can be
argued that a legislature that mandates to the judiciary what the punish-
ment must be for a person convicted of a particular crime infringes the
separation of powers, because it purports in effect to exercise what is
a judicial function, namely that of sentencing.
It is argued that such regimes reduce the judge to the status of an
officeholder applying a rubber stamp to a result pre-ordained by the leg-
islature, once a finding of guilt has been made. This undermines a key
plank of the constitutional structure, that of checks and balances between
different arms of government. A judiciary that is, in effect, directed as to
what sentence to impose does not act as a check and balance on legislative
overreach. Just as legislators cannot arrogate to themselves the function of
determining an individual’s guilt, so too they cannot arrogate to them-
selves the function of determining an individual’s punishment. Accep-
tance of either proposition would obviate the need for courts. Both offend
the principle of separation of powers. A court is not simply there to
rubber-stamp a legislative or executive determination of guilt; nor is it
there to rubber-stamp a legislative or executive determination of punish-
ment. Courts have a substantive, not decorative, role in the constitutional
design.
The argument made here has not featured in much of the American
writing on minimum mandatory penalties. Understandably, most of that
writing has focused on interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. However,
198. Chu Kheng Lim v. Commonwealth (1992) 176 CLR 1, 27 (Brennan Deane and
Dawson JJ, with whomMason CJ agreed (10)); R v. Nur [2015] 1 S.C.R 773, 816 (McLachlin
CJ, Le Bel, Abella, Cromwell, Karakatsanis, and Gascon JJ).
199. For example, the United States, Australia, India, Sri Lanka, and South Africa.
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some scholars have made the argument.200 Perhaps the strongest example
of judicial support for such an argument appears in the judgment of the
Privy Council in Liyanage v. The Queen.201 As indicated above, the Coun-
cil invalidated a Ceylonese law providing for a minimum mandatory jail
term of 10 years for particular offenders, because of the disproportionality
in sentencing that resulted. The Court found the provision was invalid
because it infringed the separation of powers principle enshrined in the
Ceylonese Constitution. It did so by imposing a ‘‘legislative judgment’’:
rather than the sentence being determined by the judiciary, it was deter-
mined by the legislature. If such laws were permitted, judicial power could
be ‘‘wholly absorbed by the legislature and taken out of the hands of
judges.’’202 The separation of powers arguments against minimum man-
datory provisions were also accepted and applied by the United Kingdom
courts in Reyes v. The Queen203 and in R (Anderson) v. Home Secretary.204
Some support for this is taken from United States v. Booker,205 wherein
the Court ruled the Sentencing Guidelines were literally that, rather than
mandatory rules. However, it must be conceded that in the decision, the
Court could have strongly based its decision on separation of powers
principles, but it did not, and the case has not been considered subse-
quently to constitutionally preclude systems of minimum mandatory sen-
tencing on separation of powers grounds.206
Articulation of the separation of powers argument against minimum
mandatory sentencing appears elsewhere. The Judicial Council of Austra-
lia, an umbrella organization of Australian judges, made a submission to
a Senate Standing Committee suggesting the unconstitutionality of min-
imum mandatory regimes, on this:
200. Kieren Riley, Trial by Legislature: Why Statutory Mandatory Minimum Sentences
Violate the Separation of Powers Doctrine, 19 B.U. PUB. INTEREST L.J. 285, 302 and 310
(2010): ‘‘these laws deprive the judiciary of its basic constitutional function, which is
weighing facts in each case to ensure a just outcome for each criminal defendant. This
violates the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers’’; Rachel Barkow, Separation of
Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STANFORD L. REV. 989 (2006).
201. Liyanage, [1967] A.C. 259.
202. Id. at 290–91 (Lord Pearce, for the Council).
203. Reyes, [2002] 2 A.C. 235, 258 (Lord Bingham, for the Privy Council).
204. R (Anderson), [2003] 1 A.C. 837.
205. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
206. Riley, supra note 200, at 294.
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Mandatory minimum sentences impact upon the separation of powers
between the legislative and judicial arms of government, and upon the
quality of justice dispensed by the courts . . .mandatory minimum sentences
sometimes require the sentencing judge . . . to impose a sentence which . . . is
disproportionate to the circumstances of the offence . . . the administration
of justice . . . can be compromised by a mandatory minimum term . . . there
is the practical inevitability of arbitrary punishment as offenders with quite
different levels of culpability receive the same penalty.207
Manderson and Sharp reach a similar conclusion. They argue that man-
datory sentencing
is a process which cannot be described as judicial, since it lacks any form of
justification, which it is the purpose of the judicial involvement to bestow. It
is not retribution. It is not deterrence. It is not rehabilitation. It bears no
relationship to any sentencing principles outlined by the courts. But it is not
parliament which is thus being required to behave in an arbitrary manner. It
is the courts. And the courts’ hard-won legitimacy and authority are there-
fore jeopardized by legislative fiat.208
Thus, several arguments are being made in relation to minimum man-
datory sentencing and the separation of powers principle. Firstly, that
sentencing is an exclusively judicial function, so that when legislators start
telling judges what sentence must be imposed, this is offensive to the
constitutional design. It undermines the fundamental idea that the best
way of limiting government power against an individual is to separate it in
different arms, each acting as a check and balance on the others. The courts
cannot fulfil their constitutional role as a check and balance on the legis-
lature if they are required to rubber-stamp a pre-ordained decision by the
legislature regarding penalty. And secondly, that courts, by being required
to apply this rubber stamp, are not acting as judges typically do. Power is
legitimate partly because of the way in which it is exercised, and the
power to incarcerate someone is one of the most significant powers that
exists. It must only be exercised when justified according to traditional
concepts of criminal justice. It is not justified simply by being mandated
207. Submission to the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs
Inquiry Into the Migration Amendment (Removal of Mandatory Minimum Penalties) Bill
2012; Trotter & Matt, supra note 183, at 589–601; LAW COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA, POLICY
DISCUSSION PAPER ON MANDATORY SENTENCING (2014).
208. Manderson & Sharp, supra note 41, at 612.
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by legislative fiat. Again, this undermines the role of the court in the
carefully crafted constitutional design. The legitimacy of judicial proceed-
ings is compromised.
Acceptance of the argument that minimum mandatory sentencing is
contrary to the separation of powers principles enshrined in the Constitu-
tion, and thus unconstitutional, is most pressing in the Australian context,
given the absence of any express constitutional provision forbidding
cruel and unusual punishment. In the United States, it is less so given the
presence of the Eighth Amendment, and the constitutional ‘‘solution’’ to
minimum mandatory sentencing in the United States is primarily consid-
ered to reside in a more expansive view of that Amendment. However, if
the Court were not minded to re-interpret this provision in a more expan-
sive way, given the precedents that have now been created, an alternative
would be for the Court to find that minimum mandatory regimes generally
offend the principle of separation of powers. This is because of the way in
which they remove judicial discretion, and amount to a purported exercise
by the legislature of power that is, in essence, judicial in nature, and
because of the gutted role that a court is then expected to play, a role hard
to recognize as being in substance judicial in nature. This compromises
the court’s legitimacy and integrity. Although the mandatory nature of the
Sentencing Guidelines has been ‘‘read out’’ in Booker, as noted above, the
majority of the states in the United States still have at least one offense on
their books that attracts a minimum sentence of life without parole. There
is thus significant scope for this doctrine to be applied.
CONCLUS ION
This article has reached several conclusions in relation to minimum man-
datory sentencing. It has noted that despite the existence of numerous
international and domestic human rights instruments proscribing cruel
and unusual, harsh, unfair, and/or arbitrary punishment, minimum man-
datory sentencing continues to feature in United States and Australian law,
in particular. The Canadian courts, and courts in other countries, have
more strongly protected individuals from the perils of minimum manda-
tory sentencing through the robust use of the proportionality principle,
requiring that imprisonment demonstrably meet penological objectives
and not be arbitrary in nature. Cases where the European Court of Human
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Rights has raised human rights objections to minimum mandatory sen-
tencing have tended to be at the extreme end involving life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole. Persistence of extremely long sentences
for relatively minor (but repeated) criminal activity is a lamentable feature
of the American case law, and surprising in the context of an express
constitutional prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment (which unar-
guably involves a proportionality element).
This article has argued that some of the legislation studied, in particular
that from Australia and the United States, demonstrates a refusal to learn
the lessons of history, in particular the dangers of arbitrary exercise of
power. It is somewhat ironic that, in the name of reducing what is said
to have been the arbitrary exercise of judicial discretion, the result has been
the arbitrary exercise of power by the legislature, deeming specific penalties
without the benefit of the knowledge of the particular circumstances in
which a particular crime was committed by a particular offender. Not
surprisingly, the consequence has been skyrocketing prison populations,
and skyrocketing costs associated with building and maintaining prisons,
for highly questionable returns.
Courts in Australia and the United States must be much more prepared
to apply a robust doctrine of proportionality in assessing the validity of
a minimum mandatory sentencing regime, albeit through different paths:
an Australian court through the doctrine of the separation of powers, and
an American court through the Eighth Amendment. The role of a judge in
the criminal justice system is critical; it cannot and must not be reduced to
that of a rubber stamp approving whatever punishments populist legisla-
tures dream up. Judges are not automatons; they should not accede to
extremely lengthy jail terms for relatively minor, non-homicide, non-
violent offenses, even when repeatedly committed. It is perfectly acceptable
for a legislature to punish repeat offending more severely, but there are
limits; 40- to 50-year jail terms for this kind of offending surely exceeds
them on any reasonable measure. The Supreme Court has robustly applied
proportionality analysis in death penalty cases; there is no principled basis
upon which it should not do so in non-capital cases.
Advocacy of this position does not mean that judges have or should have
absolute carte blanche in determining penalties. The response to arbitrary
legislative penalty setting should not be a race to the other extreme of
arbitrary judicial discretion. Judges must not overturn sentencing decisions
simply because they themselves would have imposed a different penalty, or
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because they disagree with what the legislator has enacted on policy
grounds. The choices of the legislature are indeed entitled to judicial
deference in this respect. They are democratically elected and constantly
accountable to the people. They are entitled, within limits, to adopt par-
ticular criminal justice policies with which others might disagree, and to
legislate for punishment for particular offenses that others might view as
too harsh.
However, as part of the constitutional design, the courts have a mean-
ingful role in enforcing limits. One line that the legislature must not be
permitted to cross is with respect to imprisonment that has no legitimate
penological purpose. There is much evidence to suggest that minimum
mandatory sentencing cannot be supported on deterrence grounds. It is
most unlikely to be supported by rehabilitation grounds. This leaves ret-
ribution and community protection. These can support incarceration in
many cases, but again subject to a proportionality requirement. And again,
40- to 50-year jail terms cannot be justified as being genuinely retributive
or necessary to protect the community from a person who has committed
non-homicide, non-violent offenses. And in the case of the European
Court, it is not just life-without-parole sentences that cannot be justified
on genuine penological grounds; that Court must be more prepared to
apply these principles to cases other than those involving life without
parole.
Finally, this article has argued that in those jurisdictions whose Consti-
tution provides expressly for a separation of powers between the judiciary
and non-judicial arms of government, the Court can and should find that
legislation mandating the imposition of particular penalties for proven
particular activity, and requiring the court to rubber-stamp legislature-
approved outcomes created without regard to specific cases, is unconstitu-
tional. Such laws potentially gravely undermine the separation of powers
that the creators of many constitutions carefully enacted to avoid the
arbitrary, capricious exercise of power. They require judges to exercise
judicial power in a way that is not legitimate and that undermines the
authority and integrity of a court. A judiciary that refuses to hold the line
against such legislative incursions on the judicial role risks surrendering its
fundamental role in the broad constitutional scheme.
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